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Cultural Reform, and Religious Creativity
Willis Jenkins
Complex environmental problems frustrate practical reasoning and scientific 
research, and thereby challenge relations between ethics and ecology. Sustainabil-
ity crises, in which human powers affect ecological systems in ways that jeopardize 
basic social values, become practical problems only as cultures create capacities to 
take responsibility for them. They become real problems, that is, only as cultural 
reform processes generate ways to confront and learn from social crises. Issues 
such as climate change therefore require professionals who can make challenges to 
environmental science and moral culture into sites for adaptive learning and social 
change, thereby making inchoate threats into intelligible civic problems. 
How to make crises into problems shapes an ongoing debate over compet-
ing strategies of practical reason. Should ethics critique the cultural worldviews 
and metaphysical assumptions at root of environmental crises, or should it develop 
practical responses to specific problems from broadly available cultural values? 
The question seems to force a dilemma: choosing the cosmological route lets one 
critique the depth of problems, but at the cost of distance from the moral imagina-
tion and political values of most citizens, while choosing the pragmatic route lets 
one deploy cultural values to support specific policy solutions, but at the cost of 
being constrained by the modest reforms those values permit. 
Work in religious ethics, and its companion field of religion and ecology, 
tends to pursue a cosmological strategy, examining background worldviews and 
ontological assumptions in order to challenge the cultural ideas that underlie 
sustainability problems. This approach allows ethicists to critique deep cultural 
roots, but at the cost of distance from the way particular moral communities can 
respond to environmental problems and of abstraction from the specific problems 
faced by ecological science. Because our scholarship has often been abstract from 
science-based interpretation of problems and from the cultural reform processes by 
which communities generate responses to them, I have elsewhere argued that reli-
gious ethics should adopt methods from the problem-based approaches proposed 
by pragmatists. Problem-based methods allow religious ethicists to better critique 
and cultivate the ways communities invent moral change in response to practical 
challenges.1 
Here I argue the other side; that problem-based approaches can benefit 
from considering the role of religious communities in generating cultural 
reform. Pragmatic approaches depend on cultural reform when they use adaptive 
ecological management as an instrument to deal with complex problems. Adaptive 
management  is primarily a tool for doing ecological research in conditions 
of uncertainty, but as I will show, can be extended as a civic process of ethical 
1  Willis Jenkins, “After Lynn White: Religious Ethics and Environmental Problems,” Journal 
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2reflection.  Approaching specific problems forged from broadly available cultural 
values and then reassessing values and principles in response to how management 
schemes affect the problem can help communities revise their moral values as they 
learn from science-based responses to environmental problems. An important 
implication of this approach: ecological scientists and managers must become 
adept participants in moral culture.
Adept participation in moral culture should include attentiveness to how 
religious projects create cultural reforms. Stimulating cultural change adequate to 
sustainability problems requires that ecological managers go beyond acknowledg-
ing the values held by citizens, in order to understand how moral communities 
revise their values by creating new moral capacities from their beliefs. Moreover, 
in face of the most complex problems, the creative enactments of responsibility 
and the cosmological interpretations often cultivated by religious communities 
sometimes have a constructive role to play in keeping an interdisciplinary adaptive 
management process self-critical and open. 
1. Adaptive Ecological Management as Practical Ethic 
How can pluralist cultures develop moral capacities to meet problems unan-
ticipated by their moral inheritances? The field of environmental ethics faces that 
question anew because, after a generation of proposals for ecocentric worldviews, 
critics argue that those ethical resources seem remote from the practical problems 
faced by ecologists and policy-makers, and alien from the mainstream values held 
by most citizens. A growing school of environmental pragmatists has argued that 
ethics should focus less on changing worldviews and more on practical problem-
solving. “Urgent calls for new environmental worldviews and radically revised 
ontological schemes, rather than leading to improved environmental solutions and 
conditions, only lead ethicists’ attention away from the resources already present 
within our shared moral and political traditions.”2 
Bryan Norton thinks that the field’s early entanglement with religion 
explains some of its distraction. Readers of Lynn White’s 1967 ecological critique 
of Christianity, even if they were indifferent to the religious implications, learned 
that an adequate ethic for environmental problems must rethink cultural world-
views.3 Pragmatists object that projects for new worldviews do not motivate a 
broad public or warrant policy, and so stand irrelevant to the social mandate of 
ecological research. Cosmological theories seem to alienate practical ethics from 
lived moral culture and from the sciences that address environmental problems. 
Pragmatists therefore want to develop ethics by working from specific problems 
with shared moral and political resources. By beginning with real policy dilemmas 
and practical ecological management problems, ethicists can use moral theories as 
“tools” to craft resolutions and agreements. Different problems may require differ-
ent tools. For example, human rights concepts might shape management of toxic 
2  Ben Minteer and Robert Manning, “Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics: Democracy, 
Pluralism, and the Management of Nature,” in Environmental Ethics: An Anthology, ed. Andrew Light 
and Holmes Rolston (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 319.
3  Bryan G. Norton, Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 160-6.
3risks, while biological values or place attachments guide management of invasive 
species.4
Not just any useful tool will do, however; pragmatists constrain the plural-
ism by appealing to those that the relevant civic community already possesses and 
knows how to use. Ethicists should “work within traditional moral psychologies 
and ethical theories that people already have,” argues Andrew Light. An ethic so 
crafted can help make public environmental management work by finding ground 
for a practical consensus. That is how an ethic should be evaluated, claims Light: 
whether it works to effectively build policy consensus.5
By focusing on management, then, a public facing some ecological problem 
need not share an ecological worldview in order to take practical action Norton’s 
“convergence hypothesis” supposes that adherents of diverse environmental world-
views will, by participating in processes of ecological management converge on 
similar management policies.6 Critics of environmental pragmatism have misgiv-
ings about the loss of a different kind of practicality in the reorganization of ethics 
around management. What if available ethical tools are inadequate for confronting 
the problems? What if a culture’s resources, its “traditional moral psychologies and 
ethical theories,” can no longer be trusted? What if a society’s moral imaginaries 
vary so widely as to make any consensus too weak? What if problems arrive into 
public debate narrowly framed or ideologically distorted? In the worry behind 
these questions lies the impulse for cosmological revision: a sense that our received 
moral traditions constrain us from adequately responding to ecological problems, 
perhaps because those traditions are themselves at the root of the problem. If 
so, then cosmological revision would seem requisite, and a managerial ethic of 
problem-solving complicit with catastrophe. 
The pragmatists offer a hopeful rejoinder to those questions by claiming; 
that the exercise of solving problems itself can reform and even generate cultural 
values. Minteer writes that through the practical experience of confronting prob-
lems, communities “learn about their (and others’) values and beliefs, and adjust 
and progressively improve their natural and built environments…[which] suggests 
that new knowledge and novel values can emerge from reflective and well-planned 
human activity.”7 Norton argues that the exercise of problem-solving generates the 
new values and descriptions needed to continue resolving sustainability problems: 
“the epistemology of adaptive management thus provides for gradual progress and 
improvement of both our belief system and our preferences and values, by using 
experience to triangulate between temporarily accepted beliefs and values.”8 Per-
4  See Andrew Light, “The Case for a Practical Pluralism,” in Environmental Ethics: An Anthol-
ogy, ed. Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003); ———, “Materialists, 
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ledge,1995).
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Conservation Biology. (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2003).
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America (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 6.
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4haps the adaptive process of understanding ecological problems can also generate 
the ethical reforms needed to resolve them. 
Adaptive management (AM) usually refers to an integration of experimental 
research and management, such that researchers investigate ecological systems 
in concert with policies to manage them for some social objective. When first 
proposed in 1978 by ecologist C. S. Holling, incorporating the social dimensions 
of policy into scientific research practices aimed to let ecologists better describe 
how complex systems function.9 In this sense it has often been called “learning by 
doing.”10 Especially useful in conditions of ecological uncertainty or environmen-
tal change, policies may be crafted with controls (e.g., using several management 
schemes at once) in order to let scientists assess how ecological systems function 
under different ways of managing them for social goals. Managers can then adapt 
policies in light of what research shows as the most effective models, allowing 
science-based policy to move forward even in conditions of scientific uncertainty.
Over time AM has been expanded beyond a research tool into a broad 
device of civic learning. As Kai Lee explains of processes to manage the Colum-
bia River Watershed, AM makes the political community of an ecosystem into a 
kind of laboratory, capable of systematically answering questions from imperfectly 
controlled experiments. In its conjunction of science, culture, and politics AM 
assumes that policies, economies, and ways of living in a place are experiments 
from which societies may learn, and in turn adapt. Instead of using sustainability 
as a slogan to avoid hard questions and difficult social decisions, AM makes the 
search for sustainability into a science-based process of social learning and cultural 
reflection.11 Holling thinks that AM thus rescues the intelligibility of sustainability 
from its critics by showing how its ideological plurality and openness supports an 
integrative mode of science connected to a wide sconce of social learning.12 In or-
der to work as a useful cultural arena of ethical reflection, the idea of sustainability 
depends on a social practice like AM, which can test the performance of various 
proposals. 
Considering Lee’s analysis and reconsidering his own work over several 
decades, Holling writes that AM opens a view of nature and society at once more 
integrated and more dynamic than he originally suspected. Because ecological and 
social systems are both more unpredictable and more reflexive than he imagined 
in the 1970s, Holling has come to argue for “policies and actions that not only 
satisfy social objectives but also achieve continually modified understanding of 
the evolving conditions and provide flexibility for adapting to surprises.”13 Doing 
9  C. S. Holling, ed. Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (New York: Interna-
tional Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1978).
10  Carl J. Walters and C. S. Holling, “Large-Scale Management Experiments and Learning by 
Doing,” Ecology 71, no. 6 (1990).
11  Kai Lee, Compass and Gyroscope: Integrating Science and Policy (Washington, DC: Island 
Press 1993). 7-13, 69-73.
12  C. S. Holling, Fikret Berkes, and Carl Folke, “Science, Sustainability and Resource Manage-
ment,” in Linking Social and Ecological Systems: Management Practices and Social Mechanisms for Building 
Resilience, ed. C. S. Holling, Fikret Berkes, and Carl Folke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998).
13  C. S. Holling, “What Barriers? What Bridges,” in Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Eco-
5so requires rethinking metaphors of nature and theorizing the relation of envi-
ronmental and cultural change. Such cultural analysis seems alien to scientific 
method, but AM offers a way for science to acknowledge ethical ambiguity and 
social conflict as important parts of its research context.14
AM is so popular as a framework for responding to complex problems, 
that some complain that it is “too often used as a euphemism for environmental 
management plans that admit to the need for learning in the face of ecologi-
cal uncertainty.”15 Pragmatists invoke AM in a broad sense, but not simply as a 
euphemism for muddling through uncertainty; they use AM as an intellectual 
model for introducing social values to ecological science so as to maintain research 
and management in the face of social and ecological complexity.  For Norton, 
AM functions as a model of practical ethics: it “begins with a problem-oriented 
approach, focuses on a few illustrative cases, and then works inductively toward a 
general theory of environmental values.” Theory and values come into social reflec-
tion as they are generated by successful solutions to science-based descriptions of 
problems, such that scientific descriptions and ethical arguments are warranted by 
their capacity to clarify and resolve debate in a wider political community.16 
That confounds “applied” views of ethics and science, wherein ethicists sup-
ply values and scientists supply facts, with policy-makers then using those supplies 
to resolve dilemmas. Instead, a community of participants revises both ethical 
guidelines and scientific description as it learns from policy responses to problems. 
Over time, the community discovers more adequate guidelines and descriptions 
and comes to adopt beliefs and values that prove themselves reliable for successful 
management. For Norton, that makes AM not a “pure science” but a “mission-
oriented science,” producing information relevant to socially important goals while 
also providing the context to justify or reconsider those goals.17 Norton’s proposal 
is not to make ethics more ecological, but rather to make the practice of ecology a 
way of generating the ethical values we need. 
Others have less confidence in AM as a process for generating social values. 
Ecologist Oswald Schmitz agrees that involving political management in the 
learning process about environmental problems makes social values part of eco-
logical research, but avers that generating and justifying those values happens in a 
different cultural domain.  Management policies written with experimental con-
trols let scientists test solutions to problems, thus making policy part of a science-
based form of social learning. However, Schmitz does not think that AM offers 
a practical philosophy competent to set the broader goals for policy or to host 
deliberative debate about its guiding values. While “sustainable ecosystem func-
tion” names an assumed objective for AM, establishing and justifying that social 
objective is a different kind of moral task, and one outside the competence of the 
systems and Institutions. , ed. Lance Gunderson, C. S. Holling, and Stephen Light (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995). 14
14  KN Lee, “Appraising Adaptive Management,” Conservation Ecology 3, no. 2 (1999).
15  R. Gregory, D. Ohlson, and J. Arvai, “Deconstructing Adaptive Management: Criteria for 
Applications to Environmental Management,” Ecological Applications 16, no. 6 (2006): 2424.
16  Norton, Sustainability: A Philosophy, 149-53.
17  Ibid., 294.
6AM process. Aldo Leopold showed us, Schmitz writes, that to fully understand its 
ecological problems, society must “change its ethical perspective about nature,” but 
that is not something scientists make happen, even as adaptive managers. Schmitz 
concludes his book on ecological management by endorsing sustainability as an 
achievable social goal, but says that “getting there requires a realignment of ethical 
thinking in which market and natural economies are viewed as intertwined and 
interdependent.”18 For Schmitz, then, successful management depends on cultural 
reforms that it cannot itself produce.   
Norton and Schmitz exhibit contrasting views of adaptive management 
with contrasting views of what societies can learn by doing practical ecology. For 
Norton, AM is itself a generative form of practical reasoning that can produce the 
ethical concepts required to resolve environmental problems, while for Schmitz 
AM relies on ethical realignments that a science-based process cannot fully achieve 
itself. Which frame of AM to adopt, and how social ethics relates to the science of 
ecology, may depend on the kind of problem at issue.
2. Managing Wicked Problems
Consider first the problem of invasive non-native species (INS), which has 
generated heated exchanges among philosophers and scientists. Philosopher Mark 
Sagoff claims that undefended cultural values, including xenophobic metaphor 
driven management of “invasive aliens,” which often do not pose the factual threat 
that society supposes.19 Biologist David Simberloff retorts with research showing 
that INS increase extinction risks and degrade ecosystems, thus warranting the so-
cial disvalue.20 Amidst this debate over the relevant values, what can management 
participants expect to resolve by working through this dispute? 
They can at least learn how to better communicate to civic communities 
about INS by recognizing how cultural values may come to bear on research. 
Philosopher Kristen Shrader-Frechette and biologist David Lodge argue that, by 
clearly discriminating descriptive and normative claims, scientists can help com-
munities appreciate that making policy decisions about INS depends on incom-
plete scientific facts as well as independent cultural values. With moral intuitions 
and scientific uncertainty acknowledged, a civic community can work to develop 
risk indicators responsive to accurate research and expressive of values that the 
community recognizes and accepts.21 That might be accomplished through an AM 
process that develops INS policies through broadly inclusive participatory dia-
logue about ongoing research.22 Schmitz’s view accommodates this kind of social 
18  Oswald Schmitz, Ecology and Ecosystem Conservation (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 
2007), 126, 38.
19  M. Sagoff, “Do Non-Native Species Threaten the Natural Environment?,” Journal of Agricul-
tural and Environmental Ethics 18, no. 3 (2005).
20  D. Simberloff, “Non-Native Species Do Threaten the Natural Environment!,” Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18, no. 6 (2005).
21  D. M. Lodge and K. Shrader-Frechette, “Nonindigenous Species: Ecological Explanation, 
Environmental Ethics, and Public Policy,” Conservation Biology 17, no. 1 (2003).
22  J. M. Evans, A. C. Wilkie, and J. Burkhardt, “Adaptive Management of Nonnative Species: 
Moving Beyond the “Either-or” through Experimental Pluralism,” Journal of Agricultural and Environ-
mental Ethics 21, no. 6 (2008).
7involvement for scientists, because it works from clear discrimination of facts and 
values. 
Even without Norton’s stronger claims for AM, then, environmental sci-
entists find themselves involved in social ethics and political deliberations. Some 
have therefore argued that training in ecology should involve training in ethics. 
Because it often deals with socially significant uncertainty, argue Shrader-Frechette 
and McCoy, ecology functions more inductively than other sciences, and should 
reason through its problems casuistically.23 Shrader-Frechette therefore argues 
that neither “soft” philosophy nor “hard” science can adequately resolve ecology’s 
ambiguous problems; to reason through them, “we need the practical ecology of 
case studies.”24 Minteer and Collins have proposed using AM case studies in the 
professional training of ecological scientists, in order to develop an ethical toolkit 
that helps scientists address the moral and social dimensions of their work.25 
But can an ethical toolkit assembled from case studies help resolve social de-
bates over how to respond to climate change or how to manage a watershed? Some 
environmental problems seem so open to interpretive and normative variety that 
they are difficult to even describe as a “problem” that could be managed. Climate 
change involves multiple units and scales of vulnerability, involves a wider contro-
versy of objectives, and may pose basic threats to human societies in ways that INS 
problems do not. Donald Ludwig, Marc Mangel, and Brent Haddad appeal to the 
concept of “wicked problems” (from Rittel and Webber) to explain the difficulty 
of climate change for an AM framework. Environmental problems that have “no 
definitive formulation, no stopping rule, and no test for a solution,” escape the 
disciplinary competence of ecological science, and thus “involve a host of tradi-
tional academic disciplines that cannot be separated from issues of values, equity, 
and social justice.” Ludwig et al. specifically criticize ecological management as an 
attempt to solve wicked problems from within disciplinary boundaries.26 It may 
work for resolving INS dilemmas, but not for generating meaningful responses to 
climate change.
Wicked problems like climate change or global biodiversity loss would 
seem to signal the limits of a pragmatic strategy in ethics, inviting ontological and 
religious approaches to cultural reforms. Norton’s view of AM remains optimistic 
about a pragmatist approach, however, because his concept of “management” refers 
to culturally inclusive processes of social learning about even wicked problems. It 
involves a broader scope of disciplines and participants than typical AM frame-
works, then, because it begins to reimagine moral culture as itself an adaptive pro-
cess. Norton thinks that successful societies create ways to learn from the problems 
created by their patterns of participating in ecological systems. Their management 
23  K. S. Shrader-Frechette and E. D. McCoy, Method in Ecology: Strategies for Conservation 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 114-29.
24  Kristen Shrader-Frechette, “Practical Ecology and Foundations for Environmental Ethics,” 
The Journal of Philosophy 12, no. 12 (1995): 635.
25  B. A. Minteer and J. P. Collins, “Ecological Ethics: Building a New Tool Kit for Ecologists 
and Biodiversity Managers,” Conservation Biology 19, no. 6 (2005).
26  Donald Ludwig, Marc Mangel, and Brent Haddad, “Ecology, Conservation, and Public 
Policy,” Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 32(2001): 482, 98.
8will involve experimentation and innovation, as well openness to alternative inter-
pretations of the problem and criticism of social goals pursued in resolving it. 
Norton’s framework invites ethics to consider sustainability not as a prin-
ciple or value that can be applied by managers as they solve problems, but as a 
social capacity that can be nurtured. Managers do not apply ethical values, then, 
or even deploy ethical tools; they rather facilitate a wide process of cultural change 
through learning from participation in responses to ecological problems. In order 
to create those processes, however, managers must find ways to make inchoate, 
wicked threats into intelligible social problems, and it is not immediately clear how 
even a broad management framework can accomplish that. 
In order to make inchoate issues into practical problems, ecological science 
must find ways to create initial social goals amidst ecological uncertainty while 
simultaneously establishing research objectives amidst cultural uncertainty. That 
double task informed Jane Lubchenco’s manifesto for the Ecological Society of 
America: in an age of massive human impact on planetary systems, “wise manage-
ment” depends on ecological research conducted on the problems most important 
and most challenging to the social objective of sustainability.27 Writing more 
recently in Science, Margaret Palmer et al. argue that doing “ecology for a crowded 
planet” requires investigating how human agency shapes ecological systems, assess-
ing which ecological services can be lost or technologically replaced, and articulat-
ing the policies required for sustainability. Such research exceeds any discipline’s 
competence, and Palmer et al. call for “interdisciplinary frameworks that incor-
porate multivariate causality, nonlinear feedback, and individual-based decision-
making,” as well as the impact of corporate and political decisions.28 
Understanding sustainability problems requires researching the role of hu-
man power within ecological systems even while participating in the political and 
cultural responses to those systems that reform social objectives, realign human 
power, and thus change conditions for research. The example from Ludwig et al. is 
climate change, on which they quote two researchers: “the biggest challenges are 
philosophical and methodological...We have never worked on problems in which 
the labile and adaptive nature of values, or the number of different actors with 
different values, is as central as it is in climate change.” In light of such a dynamic 
research environment, Ludwig et al. argue that “the training for those interested 
in solving environmental problems must be broader and deeper than the training 
of a disciplinary scholar.” While they must retain core disciplinary skills, “the next 
generation of ecologists” must recognize that “traditional disciplines and train-
ing are inadequate for wicked problems involving the interaction of humans with 
their environment.” Understanding and addressing ecological problems, they say, 
now requires ecologists who can learn from history, economics, philosophy, and 
religion.29 
 It seems, then, that interdisciplinary capacities of cultural criticism might 
27  J. Lubchenco et al., “The Sustainable Biosphere Initiative: An Ecological Research Agenda,” 
Science 72(1991).
28  M. Palmer et al., “Ecology for a Crowded Planet,” Science (Washington) 304, no. 5675 
(2004).
29  Ludwig, Mangel, and Haddad, “Ecology, Conservation, and Public Policy,” 484, 97.
9help generate more productive, more practical approaches to wicked problems. 
Robert Frodeman, a theorist of interdisciplinary studies, argues that AM can work 
for problems like climate change only if it includes useful reflection on how mul-
tiple disciplinary knowledges of a problem are put to cultural use.30 Learning from 
eco-social crises requires doing science and ethics collaboratively so as to make 
cultural systems capable of learning and doing new things. Understanding how 
to shape human participation in ecological systems requires understanding how 
cultural systems can make troublesome participation into real problems. Ecologi-
cal managers must then know how to engage moral culture in ways that anticipate 
those cultures can do new things. Ludwig et al. quote Donald Worster: “We are 
facing a global crisis today not because of how ecosystems function, but because of 
how our ethical systems function.”31 So how do ethical systems function?
3. Problem-Solving as Cultural Reform
Adequate response to sustainability problems requires cultural agents who 
can make ethical systems function in new ways. That observation marks a usual 
point of entry for philosophers and religionists with proposals for reforming 
worldviews. Leopold himself wrote that “no important change in ethics was ever 
accomplished without an internal change in our intellectual emphasis, loyalties, 
affections, and convictions. The proof that conservation has not yet touched these 
foundations of conduct lies in the fact that philosophy and religion have not yet 
heard of it.”32 Now that philosophy and religion have heard of conservation, per-
haps they should take the lead in creating ethical change? 
Religious ethicists, no surprise, tend to answer affirmatively, and display the 
robust moral claims that religious systems can make on convictions, affections, 
loyalties, and beliefs. Environmental pragmatists tend to worry that religious and 
other cosmological approaches will drift away from specific problems, from broad-
ly motivating civic values, and from ecological sciences. In order to make AM 
competent to wicked problems such as climate change, however, pragmatists must 
show that a problem-based approach can accomplish what a religious ethic can: 
that it can make transformative claims. They must show that ethics can transform 
the “foundations of conduct” while yet working from available values and concrete 
problems. In order to prove that, AM approaches may sometimes need to include 
religious responses to wicked problems (something many pragmatists would rather 
overlook).
Making ethical systems support innovative approaches to wicked problems 
requires bringing together problem-solving and cultural reform in such a way 
that communities learn from their most difficult problems as they adapt to them. 
Working from specific problems with the moral values resident in a community 
(the pragmatist counsel) need not rule out transformative cultural reform (the cos-
mological hope), if societies can invent new practical capacities from their moral 
30  R. Frodeman, “Redefining Ecological Ethics: Science, Policy, and Philosophy at Cape 
Horn,” Science and Engineering Ethics 14, no. 4 (2008).
31  Ludwig, Mangel, and Haddad, “Ecology, Conservation, and Public Policy,” 498.
32  Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac, with Essays on Conservation from Round River (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 246.
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inheritances. The possibility for an adaptive science of sustainability thus lies in 
making problems stimulate cultural reform. How do communities invent new 
practical capacities from their cultural inheritances? 
Answers to that question depend on assumptions of how values relate to 
cultural action. Sociologist Ann Swidler argues that culture does not simply supply 
values toward which action is oriented; rather, culture is more like a “‘tool kit’ of 
symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views which people may use in varying con-
figurations to solve different kinds of problems.”33 Cultural reform, then, depends 
not on substituting new values for old ones, because the meaning of symbols and 
stories amounts to the strategies of action they are used to sustain. Cultural reform 
happens as communities redeploy their moral inheritances to solve cultural prob-
lems with new strategies of action.
A cultural repertoire always admits a diversity of strategies, and in “unset-
tled” times, says Swidler, commitment to a new pattern of action may be experi-
enced as “conversion” to a new ideology, a radical break from tradition or common 
sense. Swidler’s analysis suggests, however, that redeployment of cultural symbols 
can permit what might appear as radical change, especially if the practical strategy 
of action they support is modeled by some moral community or social movement. 
New patterns of action in turn allow agents to develop conceptual capacities to 
recognize new problems, and thus anticipate further possibilities for cultural 
change. That is how ethical systems function: not by supplying values to guide 
social objectives, but by creating capacities for patterns of cultural action.
In order to create cultural conditions for better understanding difficult 
ecological problems, managers and ethicists must understand how moral sym-
bols function to sustain broader patterns of cultural action, and anticipate how 
they might function differently. Practical solutions may require Light’s “practical 
anthropology;” as problem-solvers explore a culture’s range of action involving 
humanity and nature, they can interpret what new forms of social agency those 
relations might support. Roger King goes a step further, claiming that effective 
environmental action depends on agents with contextual imagination, capable 
of making problems matter within a particular community’s background beliefs 
in such a way that the problems begin to unsettle, challenge and change those 
beliefs.34
Effective AM thus requires managers who know how to help make cultural 
values do new things within the communities that hold them. That scientists and 
ecological managers must become adept participants in moral culture has be-
come a familiar claim, especially for climate scientists. “Adept participation” here, 
however, includes more than the usual argument that scientists should understand 
what citizens believe and communicate their facts more clearly and forcefully to 
correct those beliefs. Helping societies revise their inherited values in response to 
environmental problems requires doing better: not just acknowledging the values 
33  Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological Review 
51(1986): 273.
34  Roger J. H. King, “Narrative, Imagination, and the Search for Intelligibility in Environmen-
tal Ethics,” Ethics and the Environment 4, no. 1 (1999).
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held by citizens, but understanding how moral communities use science-based 
understanding of problems to create new cultural capacities. 
Like anthropologists, scientists and ethicists should seek to understand 
how symbols and worldviews function within lived moral worlds. Like activists, 
they should agitate those communities to make their toolkit support new re-
sponsibilities. Ecological managers need not contest the core values and beliefs of 
that community – need not seek to change their worldview – but rather to draw 
communities into a process wherein they might invent new capacities of action 
from their beliefs in order to interpret difficult problems. This view of the ethical 
task suggests the possibility of more productive interdisciplinary engagement with 
religious communities.
 However, the theorists of AM rarely recognize religious communities 
as part of the moral culture participating in ecological management. Religious 
interpretations and faith commitments are absent in Norton and Minteer, which 
raises doubts about the scope of their cultural inclusion and the reliability of their 
convergence notions. Light does mention religious communities, but his hitherto 
creative notion of the ethical task suddenly appears flat: to articulate the values of 
“the environmental community” to some (apparently different) religious com-
munity.35 The environmental community relevant to the ecological management 
of wicked problems, however, means an entire society – certainly not just those 
self-identifying as environmentalists (which would include many religious citizens 
anyway). The religious lacuna here represents more than a failure to recognize the 
motivating values and commitments of some segments of the population; it misses 
a significant site of moral creativity. In regard to problems that flummox even “the 
environmental community,” the cultural engagement may sometimes flow the 
other way, with religious communities demonstrating capacities of social learning 
and cultural reform.
I cannot here defend a theory of religious reform and social change, but let 
me sketch a view and offer an example. Informed by Swidler’s view of culture, 
suppose that cultural change becomes possible as reform communities invent new 
possibilities of action from a received cultural repertory. In the face of unprec-
edented ecological problems, the ethical task, then, is to make a cultural repertory 
do new things. “Our task,” writes pragmatist philosopher of religion Jeffrey Stout, 
“like Thomas Aquinas’s, Thomas Jefferson’s, and Martin Luther King’s, is to take 
the many parts of a complicated social and conceptual inheritance and stitch 
them together into a pattern that meets the needs of the moment.”36 That taking 
and stitching into a new pattern of action becomes compelling when some group 
models its possibility. So the ethical task may be most effective when working with 
projects, communities, or associations that enact patterns of life that adequately 
meet the needs of difficult new problems. 
Religious communities sometimes have internal reasons to enact creative 
35  Andrew Light, “Taking Environmental Ethics Public,” in Environmental Ethics: What Really 
Matters, What Really Works, edited by D. Schmidtz and E. Willott (New York: Oxford, 2002).
36  Jeffrey Stout, Ethics after Babel : The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1988), 292.
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reform strategies. Reform projects may undertake religious responses to society’s 
most difficult problems in order to demonstrate the capacity of a religious tradition 
to meet and transform social crises. Religious creativity often uses new social prob-
lems to confirm their most important beliefs, and revise their function by making 
those beliefs support new capacities of action. Theologian Kathryn Tanner argues 
that the Christian sense of life before a creator God drives an ongoing cultural 
bricolage, in an attempt to open possibilities of responsibility before God.37 When 
religious communities direct such creativity in response to wicked ecological 
problems, they may make useful contributions to AM processes – not because they 
possess a better worldview, but because they demonstrate how to make received 
cultural values support new strategies of action. 
Consider as an example Susan Drake Emmerich’s approach to political con-
flict over a management plan for sustainable fisheries in the Chesapeake Bay. What 
appeared as a typical impasse between environmentalist and livelihood worldviews 
had more potential, she discovered, with closer attention to the dynamics of moral 
change. Living with watermen families on Tangier Island, she came to think that 
their “biblical environmental ethic,” which had thus far funded opposition to new 
management proposals, might function differently. Arriving to the island commu-
nity with exposure to other evangelical theologies of “missionary earthkeeping,” 
Emmerich thought that the island’s biblical ethic could support participation in 
the management plan. 
Observing that social change in this community was driven by women and 
the church, Emmerich initiated reflective conversations among the women and 
then encouraged the local church to develop its own biblical ethic for managing 
the Bay. Her recounting of the response is dramatic: at a community church ser-
vice, “fifty-eight watermen bowed down in tears and asked God to forgive them.”38 
Or in Swidler’s terms, they deployed the interpretive symbol of repentance to 
authorize a new pattern of cultural action that would allow them to resolve a 
cultural problem. Their stewardship metaphor offered ground for environmental, 
regulatory, and watermen groups to develop shared management objectives. Their 
“conversion” broke with common sense about possibilities of change, because it 
occurred without changing their worldview but rather using it in a new way, to 
make an intractable dilemma into a negotiable management problem, responsible 
to scientific feedback.
The example illustrates more than an odd moral community finding its 
own peculiar vocabulary for participating in a management scheme. By interpret-
ing scientific feedback about the state of the Chesapeake Bay within their ethic of 
obedient stewardship, the watermen let science-based ecological feedback fuel an 
internal logic of moral reform. As they do, they authorize other moral communi-
ties with suspicions about “the environmental community,” to create similar forms 
of responsibility that integrate environmental science and ethical reflection with-
37  Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology (Minneapolis: Augsburg 
Fortress, 1997).
38  Susan Drake Emmerich, “The Declaration in Practice: Missionary Earthkeeping,” in The 
Care of Creation, ed. R. J. Berry (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2000), 151.
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out compromising their core beliefs. They may also begin to reinterpret the task of 
managing the Bay by reimagining how humanity participates in its systems, and a 
wider society may glimpse in their enactments of responsible stewardship, alterna-
tive patterns of living in the Chesapeake. 
Moreover, the watermen’s use of a stewardship metaphor begins to enrich 
and perhaps contest the framing “management” metaphor. Perhaps AM is a poor 
concept for integrating scientific feedback and cultural response. As ecological 
feedback about the Bay shapes reflection on the adequacy of cultural response, the 
watermen may eventually come to think that management represents a pattern of 
action that prevents the wider watershed from adequately interpreting the problem 
or undertaking responsibility for it. In that case, they could propose to a wider 
public that their own model of stewardship, with its notions of human sin and 
perverse political powers, better interprets the complexity of the challenge and il-
lustrates the scope of society’s responsibility for it. 
The redeployment of cultural inheritances enacted by the religious watermen 
can thus illustrate to a wider moral culture unrealized possibilities of interpretation 
and action in its own inheritances. Mainstream moral culture need not adopt the 
religious worldview to appreciate what its symbol of repentance accomplishes: an 
enactment of responsibility that connects personal integrity with ecological health. 
Other moral communities in the watershed may find compelling the watermen’s 
personal self-examination and political critique, and may look for analogous ways 
to make their lived beliefs support actions accountable to ecological feedback from 
the Bay. Or they may just use the religious interpretation of Chesapeake sustain-
ability to pause in consideration of deeper moral questions possibly at stake and 
alternative metaphorical constructions of their cultural task.
  Reconsidering metaphors and proposing revisionary frames can sometimes 
help remodel ecological problems.39 Norton’s inclusive sense of ecological manage-
ment appreciates this function, offering something like a cosmological proviso 
for pragmatic approaches to wicked problems. When facing “messy problems, 
often involving conflicts among conflicting goods,” says Norton, there are “varied 
complaints and varied explanations of what the problem is, often associated with 
varied value positions and perspectives…But it is in this messy dialogue about 
goals and aspirations that metaphors and similes allow the reconstruction of a 
problem.” A process open to imaginative reframing, he writes, “encourages ‘social 
learning’ at the deepest, metaphorical level – the kind of social learning that can 
‘re-model’ complex and wicked problems and improve communication by disen-
tangling messes into addressable problems.”40 An AM process open to alternative 
metaphors might lead to questioning “management” precisely in order to sustain 
adaptive social learning.
Norton’s interest in the metaphorical reframing that pluralist dialogue might 
accomplish suggests that, when facing messy problems, skilled cultural negotiators 
39  See Willis Jenkins, “Assessing Metaphors of Agency: Intervention, Perfection, and Care as 
Models of Environmental Practice,” Environmental Ethics 27, no. 2 (2005).
40  B. G. Norton, “Beyond Positivist Ecology: Toward an Integrated Ecological Ethics,” Science 
and engineering ethics 14, no. 4 (2008): 590-1.
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should avoid trying to collapse a culture’s moral pluralism into a policy consensus. 
In regard of wicked problems that frustrate mainstream cultural competencies, 
scientists and ethicists might in fact look away from the moral mainstream to pay 
special attention to reform strategies from peculiar edges and minority niches, for 
there may reside alternative ways of conceptualizing the problem and promising 
ways of reorganizing cultural action. Christian ethicist Larry Rasmussen notes this 
implicit openness in broad AM frameworks: “this sustainable adaptability ethic 
assumes, even centers, what many others do not, namely religious impulses as a 
substantive contribution.”41 For responsible management of ecological problems 
with planetary scales and unprecedented human power seem finally incomprehen-
sible apart from questions about how to understand humanity’s place on earth. 
Interpretations of humanity’s role in the story of earth offer a cultural tool for 
reckoning with wicked problems by surfacing and hosting the unavoidable back-
ground question. Those tools are especially effective when their use is modeled in 
creative enactments of responsibility, which demonstrate possibilities of response to 
inchoate ecological threats.
Sarah McFarland Taylor has illustrated something like this in her study of 
“green sisters,” a network of Catholic religious communities revising their forms 
of common life. Taylor shows that many of these communities draw on Thomas 
Berry’s cosmology in order to “reinhabit” their Roman Catholic tradition as well as 
their lands and liturgies. As Taylor describes it, many of these communities use the 
new cosmology self-consciously to provide a general framework for making sense 
of ecological issues and for conceptualizing cultural and religious reform. They do 
not, by Taylor’s account, seem to adopt and apply the cosmology in the principlist 
way to which pragmatists object, but rather use it as an important imaginative 
instrument in what Minteer and Swidler would call their “toolkit.” Taylor’s meta-
phors of practical reason are, however, more horticultural: the sisters graft cosmo-
logical ideas into received traditions in order that their communities might yield 
and sustain new practices of life. As they do, Taylor sees them developing a model 
of “reinhabitation” with broader implications for how cultures might understand 
their own responses to ecological predicaments.42
Other communities thinking about different problems use Berry’s cosmo-
logical ideas differently. Some scientists, seeking a narrative structure in which to 
make sense of humanity as an ecological force and planetary manager, have found 
new cosmologies helpful for conceptualizing what must be so about the world for 
humans to simultaneously learn from it humbly, take responsibility for it, and 
acknowledge themselves threatened by it. For example, Gunderson, Holling, and 
Light wrote a book of AM case studies with an epigraph from Teilhard de Char-
din’s Hymn of the Universe, suggesting that a culture of AM needs visionary priests 
as well as interdisciplinary managers.43 Does sustainable ecological management 
41  Larry L. Rasmussen, “Ecology and Morality: The Challenge to and from Christian Ethics,” 
in Religion and the New Ecology, ed. David Lodge and Christopher Hamlin (South Bend, IN: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 266.
42  Sarah McFarland Taylor, Green Sisters (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
43  Lance Gunderson, C. S. Holling, and Stephen Light, Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of 
Ecosystems and Institutions (New York: Columbia Univ Press, 1995).
15
need as background a cosmic hymn in order to function as deeply as it must? 
The point here is that ecological management toolkits need not be threat-
ened by revisionary cosmological ideas, but should include them as heuristic tools 
available for making sense of an unprecedented research situation. Researchers 
and policy-makers facing a problem like climate change may then have reason to 
not only acknowledge but seek out communities with reformist eco-social imagi-
nations. Note that both the watermen and the green sisters come from minority 
moral communities; one from a culturally unique island and a threatened way of 
life, the other from a reformist network among a rare way of life. Yet their ideas 
might be especially important for stimulating broader cultural reform and refram-
ing difficult problems.
 As a way of participating in AM, religious and cosmological interpreta-
tions do not necessarily abstract from problems or from live cultural resources. 
On the contrary, I argue, religious creativity can support a problem-based ap-
proach to ecological management, especially when it is struggling to make a crisis 
into a practical problem. Complex sustainability problems like managing the 
Chesapeake watershed cannot be adequately understood without appreciating the 
basic questions they pose to humanity’s capacity of adaptation. As they research 
anthropogenic climate change or human alteration of nitrogen cycles, ecologists 
now investigate unplanned planetary experiments. Some management proposals 
envision intentional earth systems management or geo-engineering as a response. 
In order to interpret the moral dimensions of planned and unplanned earth-scale 
experiments, AM needs imaginative structures in which one can make sense of 
proposals for responsibility that involve humanity as an ecological force and plan-
etary manager. 
Making a problem like climate change even plausible as an AM problem 
involves the cultural processes through which societies reimagine and invent roles 
of human responsibility. Investigating worldviews and social change need not 
abstract from this problem, if it makes climate change more intelligible by disclos-
ing how practical policy proposals use cultural tools to interpret the problem and 
by anticipating what changes in cultural action may be possible. Climate scientist 
Mike Hulme argues that moral culture has been too focused on rallying values to 
support climate action in general and less attentive to how specific action propos-
als use the idea of climate change to generate diverse models of cultural action. 
Religious communities, he notes, exemplify the problem; they have offered an im-
pressive range of moral support for doing something, but in supposing that is their 
task, have generally failed to question whether cultures should think of climate 
change as a problem with a solution. Maybe the complexity of climate change begs 
for more imaginative response, more diverse cultural invention, suggests Hulme.44 
Religious communities should be able to enact new cultural possibilities; their fail-
ure seems part of the global failure to make climate change into a site of adaptive 
learning and cultural change. 
Here by negative example I again argue that religious communities can 
44  Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction 
and Opportunity (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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make useful contributions to adaptive management processes, not because they 
hold inherent moral authority or because they possess better worldviews, but 
because they can demonstrate capacities to make cultural inheritances support new 
strategies of action. Successful initiatives within religious communities sometimes 
exhibit a native fluency with grammars of change in major cultural traditions. 
When they do, these communities can function as crucibles of cultural reform, 
inviting wider society to confront the questions raised by ecological management, 
and showing some of the possibilities resident in their cultural inheritances. Cre-
ative change within religious communities can model how ethical systems might 
function in new ways. 
Ecological management need not, then, make changing worldviews or value 
structures their priority in order to let cultural reform processes generate adaptive 
responses to problems. The important tool that religion offers to AM, is not an 
exotic set of ethical ideas to add to the available stock of values and principles pro-
vided by social ethics, but rather a dispositional openness to the moral creativity of 
communities that know how to redeploy cultural tools. Those communities may 
enrich inquiry and may help stimulate broader cultural reforms that make climate 
science socially valued and politically transformative.
4. Prophetic Pragmatism
Religious strategies may, of course, themselves prove inadequate, irrelevant, 
or perverse in regard to ecological problems. Religion can function for destruction, 
as it seems to do in mountain-top removal country, as it can function for creative 
resistance, as it sometimes does in environmental justice movements. It may be 
complicit in cultural avoidance strategies, as it seems in regard of climate change. 
My argument only proposes that religious communities can sometimes help 
ethical systems function in better ways, and that when struggling in the face of 
wicked problems, ecological management frameworks should develop the cultural 
literacy and pluralist sensibility to accommodate religious creativity. Respond-
ing to complex ecological problems depends on stimulating capacities of cultural 
reform; pragmatists have no reason to exclude generative sites of those capacities 
on principle. 
A broad pragmatism, of the sort sketched by Norton and here animated by 
reform energies, must face wicked problems with restlessness for cultural reform 
and an attentiveness to promising adaptive strategies. It stands near to what Cor-
nel West calls “prophetic pragmatism”: a “quest for wisdom that puts forth new 
interpretations of the world based on past traditions in order to promote existential 
sustenance and political relevance.”45 Ecological sustenance is different from what 
West has in mind, but his view of tradition and change works toward a simi-
lar goal: skilled cultural actors (“organic intellectuals” in West) help create new 
capacities from moral inheritances, inventing possibilities for practical cultural 
reforms that in turn enable communities to take responsibility for society’s deepest 
45  Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison, 
Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 230.
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and most difficult problems.
A prophetic pragmatism remains disciplined to specific problems and com-
mitted to working with the reform strategies generated by communities facing 
those problems. It seeks reform through participation in responses to problems 
like climate change or the Chesapeake Watershed’s decline. I argue that when 
faced with such challenges, participants in problem-solving should solicit multiple 
iterations of the problem, attending especially to those communities consciously 
shaped around a thick moral tradition and apt to know how to invent reforms 
from them. In regard of climate change, involvement from prophetic pragmatists 
seems especially important as research and policy consortiums communicate 
dramatic findings with only implicit moral arguments. Ruling out the messi-
ness of cosmological or marginal approaches may prevent or delay cultures from 
recognizing how responding to climate change requires deploying ethical toolkits 
to support new patterns of cultural action. Adaptive responses must know how to 
admit comprehensive questions that reconsider our moral culture without fear-
ing that the questions will close down practical, science-based adaptation. When 
questions of cultural transformation are raised from within specific processes of 
confronting problems, they can stimulate the deliberative public on which such 
a process depends. It may be that, in a time when social vernaculars need open-
ness to change or even “cultural conversion” (in Swidler’s sense), cosmological and 
theological discourses have a role to play in holding those questions and enacting 
inventive, practical responses. 
Successful ecological management requires skilled collaborators, as capable 
of producing cultural reforms as they are of pursuing innovative research. Un-
derstanding and responding to unprecedented ecological problems like climate 
change requires an accompanying cultural climate change. Cultural reform hap-
pens as creative moral agents make cultural inheritances capable of supporting new 
patterns of action. Ecological management should seek to use and test such reform 
wherever it is produced. For resolving wicked problems depends on inventions of 
cultural hope.
